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Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
- Decimus Junius Juvenalis1
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of the separation of powers is intrinsically con-
nected to the theory of the state and the assumption that there
cannot be law without a state and that there cannot be a state
without law. The separation of powers has been the cornerstone
on which the governance of the Western legal world is based in its
constant dialectic of democracy and capitalism. It has been a doc-
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sity of Napoli Federico II; Ph.D. 2000, Duquesne University School of Law; F.A.P. 2005.
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Beyond, held at the Duquesne University School of Law on November 7-8, 2008. The au-
thor is grateful to Professor Kirk W. Junker and to Professor Robert S. Barker for the invi-
tation to the seminar. The views and opinions expressed herein are the personal views and
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1. The sentence could be translated in English as "[wiho will guard the guards?"
Liber secundus, Satira VI, 347-348 in D. Junii Juvenalis Saturarum Libri V. In English,




trine able to bring solutions to the problems of modern democra-
cies all over the world.
In recent times, several changes have occurred in the legal and
economic arenas that invite us to consider how these changes may
have influenced the doctrine of separation of powers. This paper
will give an overview of such changes and reflect on the transfor-
mation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, especially with re-
spect to the role and activity of the independent administrative
authorities.
The separation-of-powers doctrine was created and developed in
a world much different from the one in which we live today. It
was a world where closed nation-states focused on solving the
problem of how to govern a population in a national territory.
Such a model has been successful for almost 200 years2 as long as
governance issues and citizens' demands could be directly solved
by one of the three branches of the state.
II. THE INDEPENDENT-AGENCIES MODEL IN THE UNITED STATES
AND EUROPE
The development of capitalism and the consequent requests
from the different agents of democratic society (citizens, consum-
ers, workers, investors, corporations, etc.) influenced the structure
and composition of the separation-of-powers doctrine. At the be-
ginning of the 19th century in the United States, a number of in-
dependent regulatory agencies were created (e.g., in 1887, the In-
terstate Commerce Commission was established to standardize
railroad rates; in 1914, the Federal Trade Commission was set up
to prevent unfair methods of competition 3).
Some of these agencies are part of the executive branch. Others
are part of the legislative branch under Congress (e.g., the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office). The nature and purpose of inde-
pendent agencies vary widely. Some are regulatory agencies with
powers to supervise certain sectors of the economy. Others pro-
vide special services either to the government or to the people. In
most cases, the agencies have been created by Congress to deal
with matters that have become too complex for the scope of ordi-
2. Actually, the separation-of-powers model can be dated back to the beginning of the
government organizations with the Greeks and Romans. In modern times, the two main
theorists of the separation of powers are Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu
(1689-1755) and Henri-Benjamin Constant de Rebecque (1767-1830).
3. ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS,
DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 24 (Knopf 2007) (2006).
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nary legislation. In 1970, for example, Congress established the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to coordinate governmen-
tal action to protect the environment. The Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA") of 19464 established the protocols for agency
rulemaking and decisions in agency enforcement proceedings. The
APA also provided for direct judicial review of agency action in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit (and then on appeal to the Supreme Court) once all intra-
agency procedures have been exhausted.5
The U.S. experience in creating the independent agencies
clearly indicated that the classic separation-of-powers model was
unable to provide regulation to the emergent capitalism. The U.S.
model was a beacon for other democracies, which over the last 50
years have created a myriad of agencies. As we will see, the
European Union and other European nations have adopted the
U.S. independent-agencies model.
In Italy, for example, there is not a general law regulating inde-
pendent administrative authorities (in Italian, autorita amminis-
trative indipendenti). Each authority has its own rules. However,
their distinctive trait is that they are independent from the politi-
cal power. The standard formula used by the Italian legislature in
the 1990s was that the authority operated in full autonomy and
with independence of judgment and evaluation. 6 The main Italian
independent administrative authorities are the Antitrust Author-
ity;7 the Supervisory Authority Over the Public Works;8 the Elec-
tricity and Gas Authority;9 the Privacy Authority;10 the Communi-
cations Authority;1 and the Supervisory Authority over Insurance
Sector.' 2 With respect to the financial regulation, there are two
institutions: the Bank of Italy and the Financial Markets and
Stock Exchange Commission ("CONSOB"). The Bank of Italy was
created in 1893 by Law Number 449, and the CONSOB was set up
in 1974.13
4. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1994)).
5. Id.
6. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 94 (Roberto Carnata, Mads Andenas,
Duncan Fairgrieve eds. 2004).
7. Law n. 287/1990.
8. Law n. 109/1994.
9. Law n. 481/1995.
10. Law n. 675/1996.
11. Law n. 249/1997.
12. Law n. 576/1982.
13. Law Decree n. 95.
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In the European Union, several specialized and decentralized
agencies exist. 14 These agencies provide an answer for the desire
for geographical devolution and the need to cope with new tasks of
a legal, technical, or scientific nature. The EU's agencies are
grouped into the following four different categories:
9 Community agencies (bodies governed by European public
law distinct from the community institutions [council, Par-
liament, Commission, etc.]) with their own legal personalities,
which are set up by an act of secondary legislation in order to
accomplish a very specific technical, scientific, or managerial
task in the framework of the EU's "first pillar."
* Common foreign and security policy agencies (to carry out
very specific technical, scientific, or management tasks within
the framework of European Union's Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy-the "second pillar" of the EU.
9 Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters agencies
(to help the EU Member States cooperate in the fight against
organized international crime, the "third pillar" of the EU).
* Executive agencies (established in accordance with Council
Regulation (EC) No. 58/2003 (OJ L 11, 16.1.2003)), with a
view to being entrusted with certain tasks relating to the
management of one or more community programs. These
agencies are set up for a fixed period. Their location must be
at the seat of the European Commission (Brussels or Luxem-
bourg).
The European agencies try to achieve various goals. They in-
troduce a degree of decentralization and dispersal to the Commu-
nity's activities; they give a higher profile to the tasks that are
assigned to them by identifying the tasks with the agencies them-
selves; some of them answer the need to develop scientific or tech-
nical know-how in certain well-defined fields; and others integrate
different interest groups and thus facilitate dialogue at a Euro-
pean or international level.' 5 The result is a long list of agencies
today operating in the European Union.'
6
14. Europa, Agencies of the European Union, http://europa.eu/agencies/indexen.htm
(last visited April 12, 2009).
15. Id.
16. Among those agencies are: Community Fisheries Control Agency, Community
Plant Variety Office, European Agency for Reconstruction, European Agency for Safety and
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III. A GLOBALIZED WORLD: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE
The independent agencies created one century ago to cope with
the emerging modern capitalism evolved in synchrony with the
separation-of-powers doctrine as its natural completion. The le-
gal-economic panorama that we find today presents new chal-
lenges for democracies and their institutions, including the inde-
pendent agencies.
Five major changes have occurred in recent times. First is the
emergence of law without a state, 17 either in the private law area
(so called lex mercatoria or merchant law 8) or in the public law
sector (so-called global administrative law19). Second is the devel-
opment of new technologies and their increased accessibility to
consumers (especially the Internet and use of personal computers
as a means of worldwide communication). Third, globalization
and global supply chains have developed. Fourth, financial de-
regulation has occurred. The fifth major change is decentraliza-
tion and dispersion of state activities. All these changes have cre-
ated what is generally referred to as a "globalized world." They all
derive from the Cold War period and its end, and they are con-
nected to the creation of new technologies, such as the Internet
and the global opening of markets.
Health at Work, European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders, European Aviation Safety Agency, European Centre for Disease Preven-
tion and Control, European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, European
Chemicals Agency, European Environment Agency, European Food Safety Authority,
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, European
Fundamental Rights Agency (previously EUMC European GNSS Supervisory Authority),
European Institute for Gender Equality, European Joint Undertaking for ITER and the
Development of Fusion Energy (Fusion for Energy), European Maritime Safety Agency,
European Medicines Agency, European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction,
European Network and Information Security Agency, European Railway Agency, European
Training Foundation, Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and
Designs), Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union.
17. Sabino Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global
Regulation, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT L L. & POL. 663 (2005).
18. FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA [MERCHANT LAW], I1 Mulino, Bologna
(1993); FABIO BORTOLOTTI, DrRITTO DEI CONTRATTI INTERNAZIONALI [THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS], CEDAM, Padova, (1997); UGO DRAETTA, Duirrwo DEI
CONTRArTI INTERNAZIONALI [THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS], CEDAM, Padova
(1984); ALDO FRIGNANI, IL CONTRATTO INTERNAZIONALE, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO
COMMERCIALE DELL'ECONOMIA DIRETTO DA FRANCESCO GALGANO [THE INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACT, TREATY OF COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE ECONOMY EDITED BY FRANCESCO
GALGANO], VOL. XII, CEDAM, Padova (1987).
19. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
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This new "globalized world" is a challenge for democratic gov-
ernance, and the recent global financial crisis is evidence that
governments have not been able to monitor, supervise, or prevent
such a collapse. Some scholars have pointed out that capitalism
took over democracy and that we should try to rebuild a clear bor-
der between the two. 20 More than ever, the words of John May-
nard Keynes sound prophetic. Keynes, in proclaiming the end of
laissez-faire economics, 21 declared:
[T]he conclusion that individuals acting independently for
their own advantage will produce the greatest aggregate of
wealth, depends on a variety of unreal assumptions to the ef-
fect that the processes of production and consumption are in
no way organic, that there exists a sufficient foreknowledge of
conditions and requirements, and that there are adequate op-
portunities of obtaining this foreknowledge. For economists
generally reserve for a later stage of their argument the com-
plications which arise [] (1) when the efficient units of produc-
tion are large relatively to the units of consumption, (2) when
overhead costs or joint costs are present, (3) when internal
economies tend to aggregation of production, (4) when the
time required for adjustments is long, (5) when ignorance
prevails over knowledge and (6) when monopolies and combi-
nations interfere with equality in bargaining-they reserve,
that is to say, for a later stage their analysis of the actual
facts. 22
Keynes rejected liberal individualism and its proposed "essen-
tial harmony of social and individual interests" 23 and suggested
public interventionism in the economy. As a prominent American
legal scholar 24 stated a few years before Keynes, the goal is "to
find a balance between the desire of the human beings to be equal
and their desire to be free." 25 The problem is how. Any time there
is a financial crisis, the public opinion blames the lack of proper
control and the need for heavier regulation.
20. REICH, supra note 3, at 24.
21. JOHN M. KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE 23 (Prometheus Books 2004) (1926).
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id. at 23.
24. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 168 (The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 2009) (1922).
25. Id.
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IV. A MORAL CHANGE: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY
BETWEEN LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH
INDEPENDENT AUTHORITIES
The solution should not be sought in new regulations or new in-
stitutions aimed at rebuilding a border between democracy and
capitalism, between citizens and consumers or investors. In effect,
as The Economist stated recently: "The idea that the markets
have ever been completely unregulated is a myth: just ask any
firm that has to deal with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) in America[.]
'"26
The solution can be found in a moral and ethical evolution of the
societies implemented through the very same institutions that are
already in place. In other words, we should not try to create new
laws and institutions, but rather use them in a different way,
making them bearers of moral and ethical values. In a previous
article, 27 I examined the different approaches that civil-law and
common-law systems have to economic policies. Civil-law coun-
tries are more prone to public interventionism in the economy.
Common-law countries generally pursue more liberal policies. In
that article, I related the difference to the two main Western reli-
gious thoughts, Catholicism and Puritanism. I pointed out that in
the era of globalization, the distance between civil-law and com-
mon-law systems can be shortened by introducing a new principle:
complementarity between legal systems.28 I ended that article
with the observation that:
[H]istory of law is not the effect of natural conditions, and his-
tory . . . is not a "natural" but a "moral" phenomenon[29] and it
would be a "fundamental mistake"[30 to believe the opposite..
• .The leadership in the world of the law does not derive, and
cannot derive, from the economic, military or political
strength of a country but from the ethical values that it is
able to express. It is on the field of these values and their de-
26. A Short History of Modern Finance, THE ECONOMIST, October 16, 2008, at 79.
27. ANTONIO LORDI, The Influence of Italian Law on Anglo-American Contract Law:
Towards a Principle of Complementarity Between Legal Systems, INTERDISCIPLINARIETA E
PLURALISMO NEL DuIuno D'IMPRESA. L'INTEGRAZIONE DELLE ESPERIENZE E IL RuOLO DEL
GIURISTA 31 (2006).
28. Id.
29. BENEDETTO CROCE, STORIA DEL REGNO DI NAPOLI [HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM OF
NAPLES] 272 (Bari) (1925).
30. Id.
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velopment that, as it has happened in the past, the challenge
between legal systems is taking place.
31
Continuing that path, I believe that the implementation of the
principle of complementarity requires the injection of moral and
ethical values in societies throughout all of their institutions. In
such context, the independent administrative authorities can have
an important role as "moral centers"-fundamental means to im-
prove democracies due to their responsiveness to the democratic
needs of the society. They can be the main means to implement
complementarity between legal systems.
As Benjamin Constant, one of the architects of the separation-
of-powers doctrine, warned in 1819 in his speech, "The Liberty of
the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns":
The work of the legislator is not complete when he has simply
brought peace to the people. Even when the people are satis-
fied, there is much left to do. Institutions must achieve moral
education of the citizens. By respecting their individual
rights, securing their independence, refraining from troubling
their work, they must nevertheless consecrate their influence
over public affairs, call them to contribute by their votes to
the exercise of power, grant them a right of control and su-
pervision by expressing their opinions; and, by forming them
through practice for these elevated functions, give them both
the desire and the right to discharge these.
32
31. Lordi, supra note 27, at 31.
32. BENJAMIN CONSTANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS 328 (Biancamia Fontana trans., Cam-
bridge University Press 1988) 1767-1830.
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